ARTICLE / MAKALE in decentralized networks, owners of dispatchable applications can directly contract with intermittent generating sources such as wind, which is likely to be one of the lowest, risk-adjusted cost sources over the foreseeable future. The twist is !hat if the wind output ceases, or if cogenerated power supplies fail, the network curtails the dispatchable application unless it has arranged its own back-up power. This requires intelligent, information-rich networks to insure that loads do not 'lean on the system'.Under this protocol, wind producers do not worry about providing firm power (as they do under the UK NETA system for example}, and neither does the system operator. This differs dramatically from today's practices and offers significant efficiency benefits. DISCRETE LOAD MATCHING OF DISPATCHABLE APPLICATIONS Loads have betler knowledge of their moment-to-moment power and back-up needs than do system operators, an idea first introduced by Richard Tabors 25 years ago. Water heating for domestic and commercial application does not need backup power in the same way as does microchip manufacture. Vet today's centralized network makes it virtually impossible to provide appropriately priced reliability. Central dispatch and control gives reliability the characteristics of public goods such as mosquito control - which is difficult to provide to one customer while simultaneously withholding it from its neighbour. As a consequence, today's network cannot efficiently provide reliability through ordinary market mechanisms, thus creating enormous welfare losses. Half the network's loads pay too much for spinning reserves and back-up. The other half wants more. Both suffer welfare losses. lnformated networks allow loads to contract and order their own electricitv Taking this idea further, individual applications such as refrigeration systems or water healing and pumping systems can "order" their own electricity at optimal times, as Anne-Marie Borbely points out. thereby creating efficiencies that are hard to conceive in today's mass production-based electricity delivery system. CONCLUSION Network operators are the essential market facilitators in any liberalized electricity system. With proper regulation, they can play a pivotal role: they can help facilitate electricity transactions, reduce transactions costs, create open, robust markets and promote energy sustainability - all of which combine to enhance the value of commerce along the network. This is the contribution !hat properly incentivized network operators make. Decentralized grids exploit network economics and provide arbitrage opportunities. Network values rise exponentially with the level of connectivity - the number of connected loads and suppliers. Each new node provides externality l>enefits to all other nodes. lncreasing the number and diversity of connected suppliers enhances competition and reduces market power. which benefits consumers through lower electricity prices. Every network-connected independent power producer provides !his important external benefit to all market participants. At any moment, !here exist differences in the value of power among different loads and different geographic areas. Networks facilitate arbitrage - an important marketenabling role that serves to increase the value of power transactions. Decentralized networks rely on market mechanisms as oplH>sed to centralized AGC dispatch. They can betler serve widely differing electricity needs and create the infrastructure for innovation and new services not yet conceived. With effective governance and incentive regulation, intelligent decentralized networks can enhance energy efficiency and exploit the unique attributes ofa variety of technologies ranging from gas-fired cogeneration to intermittent renewables. There exists a strong, but widely overlooked, connection between the way we organize, regulate and operate our electricity grids and our societal objectives for energy sustainability. The way we run our power networks directly affects the functioning of wholesale and retail electricity markets. More importantly, with proper governance, regulation and tariff design, we can transform network operators from their lacklustre role of network caretaker, to active promoters of energy efficiency, diversity and the diffusion of conventionally fireci and renewable-based DE. Reference This article is attracted from Restructuring Our Electricity Networks to Promote Decarbonisation. Tynda/1 Centre for Climate Change Research. Working Paper No. 49. Marc/ı 2004. Some of the ideas originate in Unlocking the Benefits of Restructuring: A Blueprint for Transmission. (PUR. 1999). co-autlıored by l.eonard Hyman. Andy Vesey. Paul Addison. Richard Bower. Miclıael Crew, Lester Kink. Marija I/ic. Peter Kind. Paul Kleindorfer. Shmuel Oren, and lngo Vogelsang. The author acknowledges tlıeir contributions and also tlıanks Christian Sasse of Areva T&D Corporation for his support. Further Reading Awerbuclı. S.. "The True Cost of Fossil-Fired Electricity in tlıe El", Modem Power Systems. June 2003. Awerbuc/ı. S. 'Determining the rea/ cost: W/ıy renewable power is more cost-competitive than previously believed*. Renewable Energy World. James & James. Marclı-April 2(X)3. Awerbuch. S. and M. Berger. Energy Security and Diversity in the EV: \ Mean-Variance Portfolio Approach. Paris: lntemational Energy Agency February: Report No. EET72003/03. www.iea.org/techno/renew/port.pdf Awerbuclı. S.. M. Crew and P. Kleindorfer. 2000, 'Network-W/ıolesale Enabler', in Michael Crew. (Editor). Expanding Competition in Regulated lndustries. Boston: Kluwer Academic Press. 2000. Awerbuc/ı. S., J. Dillard, T. Mouck. and A. Preston. 'Capital Budgeting. Technological lnnovation and tlıe Emerging Competitive Environment of the Electric Power lndustry•. Energy Policy Vol. 24. No. 2. February 1996. pp. 195-202. Awerburh. S. and A. Preston (Eds.), Tlıe Virtual Utility: Accounting. Technology & Competitive Aspects of the Emerging Jndustry. Kluwer. 1997. Borbely. Anne-Marie. 'Tlıe Generation Gap'. lnTech Magazine. September 2(K)1. www.isa.org Cowart. R. H.. Efficient Reliability: Tlıe Critical Role Of Demand-Side Resources in Power Systems And Markets, prepared for The National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners. Regulatory Assistance Projeci. June 2001. Montpelier. Vermont, US. Fink, Lester. H. 'New Control Paradigms tor Deregulation.' in Marija I/ic, F Galiana and L. H. Fink. (Eds.), Power System Restructuring: Engineering and Economics. Boston. Kluwer Academic Press. 1998. Patterson, W., Overview: Tlıe Electric Challenge: Keeping The Ughts On. Working Paper No. 1. Marc/ı 2003: Sustainable Deve/opment Programme. The Royal lnstitute of lnternational Affairs. www.riia.org/sustainabledevelopment Tabors. R. I).. Homeostatic Control: Economic lntegration of Solar Teclınologies in/o Electric Power Operations and Planning. MiT Energy Laboratory Report MiT-EL 81-828, July 1981. Vogelsang, lngo. 'Price Regulation tor lndependent Transmission Companies,' Journal of Regulatory Economics. 2000, 20(2): 141-165. 1 ENERJİ & KOJENERASYON OÜNYASI ♦ -5- 8-+-=--:::...:.:..:....:.....:....:....:_::,~ __:___.::..::....=,_:_,_ - = = == == = = == =:....:.__ _ "Kojenerasyon: Yüksek Verim, Temiz Çevre, Enerjide Yeniden Yapılanma"
RkJQdWJsaXNoZXIy MTcyMTY=